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Compliance — how ISNAD maps to AI governance frameworks

The enterprise question isn’t “does your framework grade AI claims.” It’s “do you have the records my auditor will ask for.” ISNAD produces tamper-detecting audit records — a SHA-256 hash per graded claim, per link — that map onto the frameworks below.

Erasure note. The per-claim SHA-256 is a deduplication identifier, not erasure: a plain SHA-256 of low-entropy text (names, dates, small IDs) is invertible by brute force, i.e. pseudonymization (GDPR Art 4(5)), not erasure (Art 17). For an irreversible commitment, use isnad.audit.erasure.commit_claim_text(claim, secret) (HMAC-SHA256); destroying the per-record secret makes the stored commitment irreversible.

What does ISNAD record, and why is it tamper-detecting?

Section titled “What does ISNAD record, and why is it tamper-detecting?”

Every claim gets a typed transmission chain (who → who), a narrator-reliability grade per hop, a content verdict, and the resulting decision — each link hashed and the whole record signable (HMAC) with audit_signed marking whether a secret was present. Records are hash-chained, so altering any hop breaks the hash.

How does ISNAD produce evidence for EU AI Act Article 12 (record-keeping)?

Section titled “How does ISNAD produce evidence for EU AI Act Article 12 (record-keeping)?”

Article 12 obliges providers to generate and keep logs of the system’s operation. ISNAD’s chain and registry produce part of that log in machine-readable form: each transform is a timestamped, hashed, graded link, an auditable trace of how an output was produced, not just what it says.

How does ISNAD produce evidence for EU AI Act Article 13 (transparency)?

Section titled “How does ISNAD produce evidence for EU AI Act Article 13 (transparency)?”

Article 13 requires providers to document — where relevant — the mechanisms letting deployers collect, store, and interpret logs, plus intended purpose, capabilities, limitations, and human-oversight measures. ISNAD’s trace schema supports that mechanism: the decision matrix and grade rationale are the interpretation layer, and the validated-versus-not table in the README states the limits up front.

ISO/IEC 42001 requires documented information as controlled records — versioned, retained, and protected from alteration — for AI lifecycle and decision evidence. ISNAD’s versioned narrator registry (who was graded, when, at what version), the per-link content hashes, and signed records can serve as controlled evidence in an ISO/IEC 42001 audit.

The RMF’s Govern/Map functions call for provenance and traceability — documenting sources, origins, transformations, and dependencies so outputs can be traced back. ISNAD records provenance for every claim: each claim traces back through its chain to its source narrator and retrieved evidence, with the chain-scoped grounding separating what this chain actually retrieved from what was claimed.

How does ISNAD map to SDAIA (Saudi Data & AI Authority)?

Section titled “How does ISNAD map to SDAIA (Saudi Data & AI Authority)?”

SDAIA’s AI ethics principles require transparency, accountability, and traceability in AI systems. ISNAD’s graded, hash-chained provenance record supports those principles. (Specific SDAIA clause-by-clause mapping should be confirmed against the latest published guidance.)

ISNAD is evidence infrastructure, not a certification. It produces the records a compliance officer or auditor needs; it does not itself certify AI-Act conformity, ISO/IEC 42001 certification, or RMF alignment. That separation is the point: your auditors get verifiable artifacts, not a vendor’s assertion.